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Abstract—Recent research developments show that the concept
of bidirectional relaying significantly improves the performance in
wireless networks. This applies to three-node networks, where a
half-duplex relay node establishes a bidirectional communication
between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol. In
this work we consider the scenario when in the broadcast phase
the relay transmits additional confidential information to one
node, which should be kept as secret as possible from the other,
non-intended node. This is the bidirectional broadcast channel
with confidential messages for which we derive the capacity-
equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region. The latter
characterizes the communication scenario with perfect secrecy,
where the confidential message is completely hidden from the
non-legitimated node.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of relays is currently becoming more and more
attractive since they have the potential to significantly improve
the performance and coverage of wireless networks. Relay
communication suffers from the fact that orthogonal resources
are needed for transmission and reception. The inherent loss
in spectral efficiency can be reduced if bidirectional commu-
nication is considered [1, 2].
Cellular system operators offer for several users different
services simultaneously where some of them are subject to
secrecy constraints. Due to the nature of the wireless medium,
a transmitted signal is received by the intended user but can
also be overheard by non-intended users. Consequently, a
system design that enables secure communication becomes an
important issue especially for confidential information, where
non-legitimated receivers should be kept ignorant of it.
In his seminal work [3] Wyner characterized the secure
communication problem for a single source-destination link
with an eavesdropper, the so-called wiretap channel. In [4]
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized this model and studied the
broadcast channel with confidential messages. Recently, the
secure communication problem gained a lot of attention; for
a current survey we refer, for example, to [5]. The multiple
access channel with confidential messages is analyzed in [6],
while [7] discusses the interference and broadcast channel. Se-
cure communication in relay broadcast channels is addressed
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Fig. 1. Decode-and-forward bidirectional relaying. In the initial MAC phase,
nodes 1 and 2 transmit their messages m1 and m2 with rates R2 and R1 to
the relay node. Then, in the BBC phase, the relay forwards the messages m1
and m2 and adds a confidential message mc for node 1 with rate Rc to the
communication which should be kept as secret as possible from node 2.
in [8] and in two-way wiretap channels in [9].
We consider bidirectional relaying in a three-node network,
where a relay node establishes a bidirectional communication
between two nodes using a two-phase decode-and-forward
protocol as shown in Figure 1. Here, our main concern is
on enabling an additional confidential communication within
such a network. This differs from the wiretap scenario where
the bidirectional communication itself should be secure from
eavesdroppers outside of the wireless network as, for example,
studied from a signal processing point of view in [10, 11].
In this work, we concentrate on the broadcast phase, where
the relay has successfully decoded the two messages the nodes
have sent in the previous multiple access (MAC) phase. The
task of the relay is then to transmit both messages and an
additional confidential message to one node, which should be
kept as secret as possible from the other, non-legitimated node.
For decoding, the receiving nodes can exploit the messages
they have sent in the previous phase as side information so
that this channel differs from the classical broadcast channel
with confidential messages and is therefore called bidirectional
broadcast channel (BBC) with confidential messages.
For the BBC without confidential messages in [12, 13] it
is shown that capacity is achieved by a single data stream,
which combines both messages based on the network coding
idea. Here, we address the problem of realizing additional
confidential communication within a network that exploits
principles from network coding; hence, the optimal processing
is by no means self-evident.1
1Notation: Discrete random variables are denoted non-italic capital letters
and their realizations and ranges by lower case letters and script letters,
respectively; P(·) denotes the set of all probability distributions and A(n)ǫ (·)
the set of (weakly) typical sequences, cf. for example [14].
II. BIDIRECTIONAL BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH
CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
Let X and Yi, i = 1, 2, be finite input and output sets. Then
for input and output sequences xn ∈ Xn and yni ∈ Yni , i =
1, 2, of length n, the discrete memoryless broadcast channel is
given by W⊗n(yn1 , yn2 |xn) :=
∏n
k=1W (y1,k, y2,k|xk). Since
we do not allow any cooperation between the receiving nodes,
it is sufficient to consider the marginal transition probabilities
W⊗ni :=
∏n
k=1Wi(yi,k|xk), i = 1, 2, only.
In this work we consider the standard model with a block
code of arbitrary but fixed length n. Let Mi := {1, ...,M (n)i }
be the set of individual messages of node i, i = 1, 2, which is
also known at the relay node. Further, Mc := {1, ...,M (n)c }
is the set of confidential messages of the relay node. We use
the abbreviation M :=Mc ×M1 ×M2.
For the bidirectional broadcast (BBC) phase we assume that
the relay has successfully decoded the individual messages
m1 ∈ M1 from node 1 and m2 ∈ M2 from node 2 that it
received in the previous multiple access phase (MAC) phase.
Then the relay transmits both individual messages and an
additional confidential message mc ∈ Mc to node 1, which
should be kept as secret as possible from node 2.
Definition 1: An (n,M (n)c ,M (n)1 ,M (n)2 )-code for the BBC
with confidential messages consists of one (stochastic) encoder
at the relay node
f :Mc ×M1 ×M2 → X
n
and decoders at nodes 1 and 2
g1 : Y
n
1 ×M1 →Mc ×M2 ∪ {0},
g2 : Y
n
2 ×M2 →M1 ∪ {0},
where the element 0 in the definition of the decoders plays the
role of an erasure symbol and is included for convenience.
Since randomization may increase secrecy [4, 5], we allow
the encoder f to be stochastic. This means it is specified by
conditional probabilities f(xn|m) with
∑
xn∈Xn f(x
n|m) =
1 for each m = (mc,m1,m2) ∈ M. Here, f(xn|m) is the
probability that the message m ∈M is encoded as xn ∈ Xn.
A code is measured by two performance criteria. First, all
transmitted messages have to be successfully decoded, i.e.,
we want the average probability of a decoding error to be
small. In more detail, when the relay has sent the message
m = (mc,m1,m2), and nodes 1 and 2 have received yn1 and
yn2 , the decoder at node 1 is in error if g1(yn1 ,m1) 6= (mc,m2).
Accordingly, the decoder at node 2 is in error if g2(yn2 ,m2) 6=
m1. Then, the average probability of error at node i is given by
µ
(n)
i :=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M λi(m), i = 1, 2, where λ1(m) denotes
the probability that node 1 decodes (mc,m2) incorrectly if
m = (mc,m1,m2) has been sent, and λ2(m) the probability
that node 2 decodes m1 incorrectly.
The second criterion is security. Similarly as in [3, 4] we
characterize the secrecy level of the confidential message
mc ∈ Mc at node 2 by the concept of equivocation. The
equivocation H(Mc|Yn2 ,M2) describes the uncertainty of node
2 about the confidential message Mc having its own message
M2 and the received sequence Yn2 as side information avail-
able. Thus, the higher the equivocation, the more ignorant is
node 2 about the confidential message.
Definition 2: A rate-equivocation tuple (Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈
R
4
+ is said to be achievable for the BBC with confidential
messages if for any δ > 0 there is an n(δ) ∈ N and a sequence
of (n,M (n)c ,M (n)1 ,M
(n)
2 )-codes such that for all n ≥ n(δ) we
have logM
(n)
c
n
≥ Rc−δ,
logM
(n)
2
n
≥ R1−δ,
logM
(n)
1
n
≥ R2−δ,
and
1
n
H(Mc|Y
n
2 ,M2) ≥ Re − δ (1)
while µ(n)1 , µ
(n)
2 → 0 as n → ∞. The set of all achievable
rate-equivocation tuples is the capacity-equivocation region of
the BBC with confidential messages and is denoted by CBBC.
If there is no additional confidential message for the relay
to transmit, we have the classical BBC for which the capacity-
achieving coding strategies are known [12, 13].
Theorem 1 ([12, 13]): The capacity region of the BBC is
the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X;Y1|Q), R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|Q)
for random variables (Q,X,Y1,Y2) ∈ Q×X ×Y1 ×Y2 and
joint probability distribution PQ(q)PX|Q(x|q)W (y1, y2|x).
The cardinality of the range of Q can be bounded by |Q| ≤ 2.
Now, we focus our attention on the broadcast scenario with a
confidential message and present the main result of this work.
Theorem 2: The capacity-equivocation region CBBC of the
BBC with confidential messages is a closed convex set of those
rate-equivocation tuples (Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfying
0 ≤ Re ≤ Rc,
Re ≤ I(V;Y1|U)− I(V;Y2|U),
Rc +Ri ≤ I(V;Y1|U) + I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2,
Ri ≤ I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2,
for random variables (U,V,X,Y1,Y2) ∈ U × V ×
X × Y1 × Y2 and joint probability distribution
PU(u)PV|U(v|u)PX|V(x|v)W (y1, y2|x). Moreover, the
cardinalities of the ranges of U and V can be bounded by
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3, |V| ≤ |X |2 + 4|X |+ 3.
Remark 1: While for the BBC without confidential mes-
sages the auxiliary random variable Q only enables a time-
sharing operation and carries no information, cf. Theorem 1,
for the BBC with confidential messages we will see that the
auxiliary random variable U carries the bidirectional informa-
tion and V realizes an additional randomization.
From Theorem 2 follows immediately the secrecy capacity
region CSBBC of the BBC with confidential messages which
is the set of rate triples (Rc, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ such that
(Rc, Rc, R1, R2) ∈ CBBC.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity region CSBBC of the BBC
with confidential messages is the set of all rate triples
(Rc, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying
Rc ≤ I(V;Y1|U)− I(V;Y2|U),
Ri ≤ I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2,
for random variables (U,V,X,Y1,Y2) ∈ U × V ×
X × Y1 × Y2 and joint probability distribution
PU(u)PV|U(v|u)PX|V(x|v)W (y1, y2|x).
The capacity-equivocation region in Theorem 2 describes
the scenario where the confidential message is transmitted with
rate Rc at a certain secrecy level Re. Thereby, Re can be
interpreted as the amount of information of the confidential
message that can be kept secret from the non-legitimated
node. Therefore, Theorem 2 includes the case where the
non-legitimated node has some partial knowledge about the
confidential information, namely if Rc > Re. The secrecy
capacity region in Corollary 1 characterizes the scenario with
perfect secrecy which is, of course, the practically more
relevant case. Since Rc = Re, the confidential message can
be kept completely hidden from the non-legitimated node.
III. SECRECY-ACHIEVING CODING STRATEGY
In this section, we present a coding strategy that achieves
the desired rates with the required secrecy level and therewith
prove the achievability part of the corresponding Theorem 2.
A. Codebook Design
A crucial part is the following Lemma 1 which ensures
the existence of a suitable codebook with a specific structure
consisting of two layers.
The first layer corresponds to a codebook suitable for the
BBC with common messages [15] which means that this
set of codewords enables the relay to transmit (bidirectional)
individual messages m′2 ∈ M′2 and m′1 ∈ M′1 to nodes 1 and
2 as well as a common (multicast) message m′0 ∈M′0 to both
nodes.
Then, for each codeword there is a sub-codebook with a
product structure similarly as in [4] for the classical broadcast
channel with confidential messages. The legitimate receiver
for the confidential message, i.e., node 1, can decode each
codeword regardless to which column and row index it cor-
responds. But the main idea behind such a codebook design
is that the non-legitimated receiver, i.e., node 2, decodes the
column index of the transmitted codeword with the maximum
rate its channel provides, and therefore is not able to decode
the remaining row index [5].
Lemma 1: For any δ > 0 let U→ X→ Y1Y2 be a Markov
chain of random variables and I(X;Y1|U) > I(X;Y2|U).
i) There exists a set of codewords unm′ ∈ Un, m′ =
(m′0,m
′
1,m
′
2) ∈M
′
0 ×M
′
1 ×M
′
2 =:M
′
, with
1
n
(
log |M′0|+ log |M
′
2|
)
≥ I(U;Y1)− δ, (2a)
1
n
(
log |M′0|+ log |M
′
1|
)
≥ I(U;Y2)− δ, (2b)
such that
1
|M′|
∑
m′∈M′
λm′0,m′2|m′1 ≤ ǫ
(n), (3a)
1
|M′|
∑
m′∈M′
λm′0,m′1|m′2 ≤ ǫ
(n), (3b)
and ǫ(n) → 0 as n → ∞. Thereby, λm′0,m′2|m′1 denotes
the probability that node 1 decodes (m′0,m′2) ∈ M′0 ×M′2
incorrectly if m′1 ∈ M′1 is given. The error event λm′0,m′1|m′2
for node 2 is defined accordingly.
ii) For each unm′ ∈ Un there exists a set of (sub-)codewords
xnjlm′ ∈ X
n
, j ∈ J , l ∈ L, m′ ∈M′, with
1
n
log |J | ≥ I(X;Y2|U)− δ, (4a)
1
n
log |L| ≥ I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Y2|U)− δ, (4b)
such that
1
|J ||L||M′|
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
m′∈M′
λj,l|m′ ≤ ǫ
(n), (5a)
1
|J ||L||M′|
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
m′∈M′
λj|l,m′ ≤ ǫ
(n), (5b)
and ǫ(n) → 0 as n→∞. Here, λj,l|m′ is the probability that
node 1 decodes j ∈ J or l ∈ L incorrectly if m′ ∈ M′ is
known. Similarly, λj|l,m′ is the probability that node 2 decodes
j ∈ J incorrectly if m′ ∈M′ and l ∈ L are given.
Sketch of Proof: Since the proof is based on the classical
broadcast channel with confidential messages [4] and the BBC
with common messages [15] we only sketch the main ideas.
For the first layer we generate |M′| codewords unm′ ∈ Un
according to the distribution PUn(un) =
∏n
k=1 PU(uk) and
use (weakly) typical sets A(n)ǫ (U,Yi), i = 1, 2, for decoding
at the receivers. Then, using random coding arguments, for
the BBC with common messages we know from [15] that (3)
is satisfied if (2) is fulfilled proving the first part.
To prove the second assertion, for each unm′ ∈ Un
we generate |J ||L| codewords xnjlm′ ∈ Xn according to
PXn|Un(x
n|un) =
∏n
k=1 PX|U(xk|uk) and use typical sets
A
(n)
ǫ (U,X,Yi), i = 1, 2, for decoding at the receivers. We
note that the structure of the sub-codewords is exactly the
same as for the classical broadcast channel with confidential
messages [4, 5], where the latter assumes the average error cri-
terion and uses random coding arguments as we do. Following
the proof it is easy to show that (5) is satisfied if (4) is fulfilled
proving the second part.
B. Achievable Rate-Equivocation Region
Next, we use the codebook from Lemma 1 to construct
suitable encoder and decoders for the BBC with confidential
messages.
Lemma 2: Let U → X → Y1Y2 and I(X;Y1|U) >
I(X;Y2|U). Using the codebook from Lemma 1 all rate-
equivocation tuples (Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfying
0 ≤ Re = I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Y2|U) ≤ Rc, (6a)
Rc +Ri ≤ I(X;Y1|U) + I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2, (6b)
Ri ≤ I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2, (6c)
are achievable for the BBC with confidential messages.
Proof: For given rate-equivocation tuple
(Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfying (6a)-(6c) we have to
I(U;Y1)
I(U;Y2) I(X;Y2|U)
I(X;Y1|U)
LJM′0M
′
1M
′
2
Rc ≥ I(X;Y1|U)
Fig. 2. The two bars visualize the available resources of both links. Each one
is split up into two parts: one designated for the bidirectional communication
(gray) and one for the confidential message (white). Since Rc ≥ I(X;Y1|U),
some resources of the bidirectional communication have to be spent for the
confidential message as well (realized by a common message).
construct message sets, encoders, and decoders with
1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (7a)
1
n
log |M2| ≥ R1 − δ, (7b)
1
n
log |M1| ≥ R2 − δ, (7c)
and further, cf. also (1),
1
n
H(Mc|Y
n
2 ,M2) ≥ I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Y2|U)− δ. (8)
The following construction is mainly based on the one for
the classical broadcast channel with confidential messages
[4]. Thereby, we have to distinguish between two cases as
visualized in Figures 2 and 3.
If Rc ≥ I(X;Y1|U), cf. Figure 2, we construct the set of
confidential messages as
Mc := J × L ×M
′
0
where J and L are chosen as in Lemma 1 and M′0 is an
arbitrary set of common messages such that (7a) is satisfied.
The sets M1 = M′1 and M2 = M′2 are arbitrary such that
(7b)-(7c) hold. Finally, we define the deterministic encoder f
that maps the confidential message (j, l,m′0) ∈ Mc and the
individual messages mi ∈ Mi, i = 1, 2, into the codeword
xnjlm′ ∈ X
n with m′ = (m′0,m′1,m′2) and m′i = mi, i = 1, 2.
Remark 2: Since Rc ≥ I(X;Y1|U), a part of the confi-
dential message must be transmitted as a common message.
It is not possible to simply ”add” the remaining part to the
individual message for node 1, since this would require that
this part of the confidential message is already available a
priori as side information at node 2.
If Rc < I(X;Y1|U), cf. Figure 3, we set Mc := K × L
where K is an arbitrary set such that (7a) holds. Further, we
define a mapping h : J → K that partitions J into subsets of
”nearly equal size” [4], which means
|h−1(k)| ≤ 2|h−1(k′)|, for all k, k′ ∈ K.
Moreover, since Rc < I(X;Y1|U), there is no need for
a set of common messages so that M′0 = ∅. The sets
M1 = M′1 and M2 = M′2 are arbitrary such that (7b)-(7c)
hold. Finally, we define the stochastic encoder f that maps the
confidential message (k, l) ∈Mc and the individual messages
mi ∈ Mi, i = 1, 2, into the codeword xnjlm′ ∈ Xn with
m′ = (0,m′1,m
′
2), where j is uniformly drawn from the set
h−1(k) ⊂ J and m′i = mi, i = 1, 2.
I(X;Y2|U)
I(X;Y1|U)
I(U;Y2)
I(U;Y1)
M′1M
′
2 LJ
Rc < I(X;Y1|U)
K
Fig. 3. Since Rc < I(X; Y1|U), there are more resources for the confidential
message available than needed. This allows the relay to enable a stochastic
coding strategy which exploits all the available resources by introducing a
mapping from J to K.
Remark 3: This time, the set J is not needed in total for the
confidential message. However, to force the non-legitimated
receiver, i.e., node 2, to decode at its maximum rate, we define
a stochastic encoder that spreads the confidential messages
over the whole set J .
Up to now we defined message sets and the encoder. In both
cases the decoders are immediately determined by Lemma 1.
To complete the proof it remains to show that the secrecy
level at node 2 fulfills (8). Proceeding exactly as in [4] we
define the random variable Xn with codewords xnjlm′ ∈ Xn
as realizations and M′ = (M′0,M′1,M′2) as the third coordinate
of the realization of Xn. Then get for the equivocation
H(Mc|Y
n
2 ,M2) ≥ H(X
n|M′) +H(Yn2 |X
n)
−H(Xn|Mc,M
′,Yn2 )−H(Y
n
2 |M
′).
(9)
Next, we bound all terms in (9) separately. We start with the
first term and observe for given M′ = m′ that Xn has |J ||L|
possible values. Since Xn is independently and uniformly
distributed, we have H(Xn|M′) = log |J |+ log |L|. With the
definition of J and L, cf. (4), we obtain
1
n
H(Xn|M′)→ I(X;Y1|U). (10)
For the second term in (9) we have
1
n
H(Yn2 |X
n)→ H(Y2|X) (11)
as n → ∞ by the weak law of large numbers. If
Rc ≥ I(X;Y1|U), the third term in (9) vanishes. If
Rc < I(X;Y1|U), we define ϕ(k, l,m′, yn2 ) := xnklm′ if
(unm′ , x
n
jlm′ , y
n
2 ) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (U,X,Y2), h(j) = k, and arbitrary
otherwise. Then we have P{Xn 6= ϕ(Mc,M′,Yn2 )} ≤ ǫ(n)
and therefore, by Fano’s lemma, cf. also [4, 5],
1
n
H(Xn|Mc,M
′,Yn2 )→ 0 (12)
as n → ∞. For the last term in (9) we define yˆn2 := yn2 if
(unm′ , y
n
2 ) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (U,Y2) and arbitrary otherwise so that
H(Yn2 |M
′) ≤ H(Yn2 |Yˆ
n
2 ) +H(Yˆ
n
2 |M
′).
For the first term we have P{Yn2 6= Yˆn2 } ≤ ǫ(n) by Fano’s
lemma, cf. [4, 5], so that it is negligible. Moreover, following
[4, 5] it is easy to show that for the second term we have
1
n
H(Yˆn2 |M
′)→ H(Y2|U) (13)
which follows from the definition of the decoding sets
A
(n)
ǫ (U,Y2) and the fact that the codewords are uniformly
distributed.
Finally, by substituting (10)-(13) into (9) we obtain (8)
which establishes the desired secrecy level at node 2 and
therewith proves the lemma.
C. Randomization and Convexity
Here, we complete the proof of achievability of Theorem 2.
Since the argumentation is the same as for the classical
broadcast channel with confidential messages [4], we only
sketch the main ideas.
To obtain the whole region of Theorem 2, we proceed
exactly as in [4] and introduce an auxiliary channel that
enables an additional randomization.
Lemma 3: Let U → V → X → Y1Y2 and
I(V;Y1|U) > I(V;Y2|U). Then all rate-equivocation tuples
(Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfying
0 ≤ Re ≤ I(V;Y1|U)− I(V;Y2|U) ≤ Rc, (14a)
Rc +Ri ≤ I(V;Y1|U) + I(U;Yi), i = 1, 2, (14b)
Ri ≤ I(U,Yi), i = 1, 2, (14c)
are achievable for the BBC with confidential messages. The
corresponding rate region is denoted by R.
Sketch of Proof: The prefixing realized by the random
variable V is exactly the same as in [4, Lemma 4].
Moreover, it is obvious that if the rate-equivocation tuple
(Rc, Re, R1, R2) is achievable, than each rate-equivocation
tuple (Rc, R′e, R1, R2) with 0 ≤ R′e ≤ Re is also achievable.
Consequently, we can further replace the equality in (6a) by
an inequality in (14a).
Lemma 4: The rate region R is convex.
Sketch of Proof: Exactly as in [4, Lemma 5] it is easy
to show that any linear combination of two rate tuples in R
is contained in R which proves the convexity.
It remains to show that R describes the same rate region as
the one specified by Theorem 2.
Lemma 5: The rate region R equals the capacity region
CBBC of the BBC with confidential messages.
Proof: It is obvious that R ⊆ CBBC holds. To show the
reversed inclusion, i.e., CBBC ⊆ R, let (Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈
CBBC be any rate-equivocation tuple. For this, we construct as
in [4] the maximal achievable confidential and equivocation
rates that are possible for given individual rates R1 and R2 as
R∗c := I(V;Y1|U) +min
{
I(U;Y1)−R1, I(U;Y2)−R2
}
,
R∗e := I(V;Y1|U) − I(V;Y2|U).
Then we have Re ≤ R∗e , R∗e ≤ Rc ≤ R∗c , and therewith
also (R∗c , R∗e , R1, R2) ∈ R. Now, from the definition of
R follows that the rate-equivocation tuples (R∗c , R∗e , R1, R2),
(R∗c , 0, R1, R2), and (0, 0, R1, R2) belong to R as well. Fi-
nally, from the convexity of R, cf. Lemma 4, follows that
(Rc, Re, R1, R2) ∈ R which proves the lemma.
To complete the proof of achievability it remains to bound
the cardinalities of the ranges of U and V. Since the bounds
of the cardinalities depend only the structure of the random
variables, the result follows immediately from [4, Appendix]
where the same bounds are established for the classical broad-
cast channel with confidential messages.
D. Weak Converse
Already the coding strategy indicates that, basically, ideas
from the BBC [12, 15] and from the classical broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages [4] are exploited. Based on this
observation it is straightforward to establish the weak converse
for the BBC with confidential messages by extending the
converse of the classical broadcast channel with confidential
messages [4] using standard arguments for the BBC [12, 15].
IV. DISCUSSION
In this work, our focus was on privacy in bidirectional relay
networks, where additionally to the two bidirectional messages
the relay node transmits a confidential message to one of
the nodes, which should be kept as secret as possible from
the other, non-legitimated node. For this scenario we charac-
terized the corresponding capacity-equivocation and secrecy
capacity regions in detail. This scenario is completely different
from the bidirectional broadcast wiretap channel, where the
bidirectional communication itself should be kept secret from
eavesdroppers outside of the bidirectional relay network [10,
11]. This is an interesting and important topic for itself.
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